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ABSTRACT: New Economic Geography (NEG) models do not typically account for the 
presence of regions other than the ones involved in the integration process. We explore such a 
possibility in a Footloose Entrepreneur (FE) model aiming at studying the stability properties 
of long-run industrial location equilibria. We consider a world economy composed by a cus-
toms union of two regions (regions 1 and 2) and an “outside region” which can be regarded as 
the rest of the world (region 3). The effects of economic integration on industrial agglomera-
tion within the customs union are studied under the assumption of a constant distance between 
the customs union itself and the third region. The results show that higher economic integra-
tion does not always implies the standard result of full agglomeration of FE models. This in-
complete agglomeration outcome is due to the fact that the periphery region keeps a share of 
industrial activities in order to satisfy a share of “external demand”. That is, the deindustriali-
zation process brought about by economic integration in the periphery of the union is mitigat-
ed by the demand of consumers living in the rest of the world. In general, the market size of 
the third region affects the number of the long-run equilibria, as well as their stability proper-
ties. In addition to the standard outcomes of FE models, we describe the existence of two 
asymmetric equilibria characterised by unequal distribution of firms between regions 1 and 2, 
with no full agglomeration though. Interestingly, these equilibria are stable and therefore can 
be regarded as a likely long-run equilibrium state of the economy. 
Keywords: industrial agglomeration, three-region NEG models, footloose entrepreneurs. 
JEL classification: C62, F12, F2, R12. 
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1. Introduction 
Will further economic integration increase or reduce regional disparities? This is one of the 
core questions in European policy discussions. The analysis of integration areas is one of the 
classical topics in trade theory (for an overview see, e.g., Krishna, 2008); however, in the 
following we apply a New Economic Geography (NEG) framework, since with its emphasis 
on endogenous agglomeration processes it seems to be particularly suited to analyse the 
effects on regional disparities. Economic integration – represented by a reduction in trade cost 
– influences the balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces and depending upon which 
force prevail the long-run the spatial distribution of economic activity may differ. Typically, 
NEG models allow for two standard long-run outcomes: an equal distribution of the 
manufacturing activity between the regions or, with a sufficient reduction of trade costs, full 
agglomeration in one of the two regions (see, for reviews, Fujita et al., 1999; and Baldwin et 
al., 2003). The analytic structure of NEG models is intrinsically complex, therefore many 
NEG models are actually confined to the analysis of two regions. However, for a 
comprehensive study of integration areas this is not sufficient: one has to differentiate at least 
between two regions inside the integration area and one region outside. So far a small strand 
of literature has developed three-region models though. Within this literature, Paluzie (2001) 
shows that a reduction in the external trade cost strengthens the agglomerative forces in the 
home country with two regions. Similar results are put forward by Alonso-Villar (1999, 
2001), and Monfort and Nicolini (2000). In contrast, Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) 
argue that a reduction in the international transport cost may favour dispersion of economic 
activity between the two regions in the home country (in their model the domestic dispersion 
force is due to land rent and commuting costs and is thus exogenous and independent of trade 
costs). Brülhart et al. (2004) and Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2004) introduce more 
geographical structure into the analysis, as they assume that one of the home regions is a 
border region, i.e. that it has lower transport cost wrt the outside region than the other home 
region. Also in this framework, a reduction of the international transport cost favours 
agglomeration in the two-regions home country; in particular (but not always), agglomeration 
in the border region. Interestingly, Brülhart et al. (2004) point out that the size of the third 
region matters for the results. 
Taking a closer look to the above mentioned contributions reveals that these studies only 
address one part of the issues at hand as they only analyse the effects of a closer integration 
with the rest of the world; however, neglecting the effects of a closer integration within the 
3 
 
integration area. In our paper, we are focussing on the latter issue while deliberately 
neglecting the former. 
We explore the effects of trade integration between two (symmetric, home) regions (1 and 2) 
in the presence of a third region (region 3), that is upon construction a mere outside region. As 
a first result we show that our construction implies that transport cost with the third region do 
not matter. Nevertheless, the third country is important as (outside) market and its size 
influences the balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces between the two 
countries/regions inside the integration area. To put it differently: The effects of a trade 
liberalisation between the two countries inside the integration area will depend upon the size 
of the third region, upon the importance of the outside links for the integration area. 
In particular, we show that with an increase of the size of third region the symmetric 
equilibrium between the two regions/countries within the integration area loses stability at a 
lower value of the trade freeness inside the integration area. To put it differently: Stronger 
outside links favour agglomeration within the integration area. 
In addition, and this is our main result, we show that the size of the third region also 
influences what happens, if the symmetric equilibrium is unstable. With instability, factor 
mobility sets in leading to asymmetries in the factor allocation; this asymmetry changes itself 
the strength of the agglomerative and deglomerative forces and we show analytically that for 
a smaller third region the agglomerative forces outweigh the deglomerative forces leading to 
full agglomeration in one of the regions inside the integration area; instead, for a bigger third 
region, asymmetries weaken the agglomerative processes and strengthen the deglomerative 
forces – and interior asymmetric equilibra can be established. 
This result is important, first, because it shows that even if with a reduction of trade costs with 
the integration area the symmetric equilibrium loses stability (as found also in the papers 
reviewed above), the long-run outcome need not be full agglomeration, but may also be 
partial agglomeration (thus a reduction of trade costs does not lead to extreme regional 
disperion). Second, the result is important because it is one of the rare examples in the NEG 
literature that produces partial agglomeration as the outcome of an endogenous process. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the basic framework 
of the model. In section 3 we characterize the short-run equilibrium. Section 4 deals with our 
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complete dynamical model, whose local stability properties are studied in section 5. Section 6 
reports preliminary results on global dynamics. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Basic framework 
The economic system is composed of three regions (r = 1, 2, 3) and two sectors. The 
traditional or agricultural sector (A) is located in all three regions, whereas the manufacturing 
sector (M) can be localised at most in two regions (s = 1, 2). Production involves the use of 
two factors of production, unskilled labour (L) and entrepreneurs (N). In the overall economy, 
the amount of unskilled labour is L: a share   is equally distributed between the 
manufacturing regions 1 and 2 and the rest is located in region 3 (the region without 
manufacture), i.e. 1 2 2
= =

   and 3 1= −  . Unskilled labour does not migrate; the N 
existing entrepreneurs, instead, are mobile between regions 1 and 2. 
Assuming that unskilled workers and entrepreneurs possess the same tastes, we write the 
representative consumer’s utility function as follows: 
 1A MU C C
µ µ−=  (1) 
where AC  and MC  correspond to the consumption of the homogeneous agricultural good and 
of a composite of manufactured goods:  
 
1
1
n
M i
i
C d
σ
σ
−
=
=∑  (2) 
where id  is the consumption of good i, n is the total number of manufactured goods and σ > 1 
is the constant elasticity of substitution; the lower σ, the greater the consumers’ taste for 
variety. The exponents in the utility function 1 – µ and µ indicate, respectively, the invariant 
shares of disposable income devoted to the agricultural and manufactured goods, with 
0 < µ < 1. 
Only labour is used in the production of the homogeneous agricultural good. One unit of 
(unskilled) labour is used to produce one unit of the agricultural output, so that constant 
returns prevails. Moreover, we assume that none of the regions has enough labour to engage 
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exclusively in the production of the agricultural good, the so-called ‘non-full-specialization 
condition’.  
The manufacturing sectors involve monopolistic competition as modelled by Dixit-Stiglitz 
(1977). In our context, each firm requires a fixed input of an entrepreneur to operate and β 
units of unskilled labour for each unit produced. Since one entrepreneur is needed for each 
firm, the total number of firms always equals the total number of entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
because of consumers’ preference for variety and increasing returns in production, a firm 
would always produce a variety different from those produced by other firms. It follows that 
the number of varieties always equals the number of firms. Denoting the share of 
entrepreneurs located in region 1 in period t by tλ  and by N the total number of entrepreneurs, 
the number of regional varieties produced in period tin region 1 and 2 are 
 1, 2, (1 )t t t tn N n Nλ λ= = −  (3) 
where 0 1tλ≤ ≤  and where, by assumption, no manufacturing activity occurs in region 3. 
Transportation of the agricultural product between regions is costless. Transport costs for 
manufactures take an iceberg form: if one unit is shipped from region s to region r only 1 rsT  
arrives, where 1rsT ≥ , 1, 2,3r =  and 1, 2s = . 
Region 1 and 2 are involved in a trade agreement whereas the economic integration with 
region 3 is less deep. We model this spatial arrangement as follows: the three regions are 
located on the vertices of a isosceles triangle 
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Figure 1 
The “distance” (trade barriers) between regions 1 and 2 is S (short); the distance between 1 
and 3 and 2 and 3 is the same and is equal to L (long). Transport costs between regions 1 and 
2 are 
 12 ST T= ,  
and between regions 1 and 3 and regions 2 and 3 are 
 13 23 LT T T= =  
where 1L ST T> ≥ . Finally, in order to simplify the notation, we introduce the following “trade 
freeness” parameters: 12 Sφ φ= , 13 23 Lφ φ φ= = , where 
1
S ST
σφ −≡  and 1L LT
σφ −≡  and where 
1L Sφ φ< ≤ .  
 
3. Short-run general equilibrium 
The short-run equilibrium in period t is characterized by a given spatial allocation of 
entrepreneurs across the regions, ,r tλ . In a short-run general equilibrium, which is established 
instantaneously in each period, supply equals demand for the agricultural commodity and 
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each manufacturer meets the demand for its variety. As a result of Walras’s law, 
simultaneously equilibrium in the product markets implies equilibrium in the regional labour 
markets.  
With zero transport costs, the agricultural price is the same across regions. Denoting by Y the 
income of the overall economy, that (as confirmed below) is invariant over time, total 
expenditure on the agricultural product is (1 )Yµ− . Assuming (1 ) max , 1
2
Y L Lµ   − > −  
  


 
all regions produce the agricultural commodity, whereas 
( )(1 ) max , 1
2
Y L Lµ  − > − 
 

 implies that no single region is able to satisfy all the demand 
for the agricultural good. Since competition results in zero agricultural profits, the short-run 
equilibrium nominal wage in period t is equal to the agricultural product price and therefore is 
always the same across regions. Setting this wage/agricultural price equal to 1, it becomes the 
numeraire in terms of which the other prices are defined. Facing a wage of 1, each 
manufacturer has a marginal cost of β. Each maximizes profit on the basis of a perceived price 
elasticity of σ−  and sets a local (mill) price p for its variety, given by 
 
1
p σ β
σ
=
−
 (4) 
The effective price paid by consumers in region r for a variety produced in region s is rspT . 
The regional manufacturing price index facing consumers in region r is given by  
 
1
2 1
1 1
,
1
r t s rs
s
P n p T
σ
σ σ
−
− −
=
 
=  
 
∑   
Under our assumptions, we can write 
 
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1 1 1
1, 1 2
1
1 1 1 1
2, 1 2
1
1 1 1 1 1
3, 1 2
t S
t S
t L L
P n p n p T
P n p T n p
P n p T n p T
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ
− − − −
− − − −
− − − − −
= +
= +
= +
  
and therefore 
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1 1
1 1
, ,r t r tP N pσ σ− −= ∆  (5) 
where 1, (1 )t t S tλ φ λ∆ = + −  , 2, 1t S t tφ λ λ∆ = + − , 3, t Lφ∆ =  . 
The demand facing a producer located in region s is 
 
3 3
1 1 1 1
, , , , ,
1 1
s t r t r t rs r t r t rs
r r
d Y P T p s P T Ypσ σ σ σ σ σµ µ− − − − − −
= =
   
= =   
   
∑ ∑  (6) 
We can write: 
 
( )1 1 1 1 11, 1, 1, 2, 2, 21 3, 3, 31
1, 2, 3,1 1
1, 2, 3,
1, 2, 3,
1, 2, 3,
1, 2,
3,
1, 2,
2, 1, 1,
t t t t t t t
t t t
S L
t t t
t t t
S L
t t t
t t
S t
t t
t t t
d s P s P T s P T Yp
s s s YpT T
N
s s s Yp
N
s s Yps
N
d s P
σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ
σ
µ
µ
µ
φ φ
µ
φ
− − − − − −
− −
= + +
 
= + +  ∆ ∆ ∆ 
 
= + +  ∆ ∆ ∆ 
 
= + +  ∆ ∆ 
= ( )1 1 1 1 112 2, 2, 3, 3, 32
1, 2, 3,1 1
1, 2, 3,
1, 2, 3,
1, 2, 3,
1, 2,
3,
1, 2,
t t t t
t t t
S L
t t t
t t t
S L
t t t
t t
S t
t t
T s P s P T Yp
s s s YpT T
N
s s s Yp
N
s s Yps
N
σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ
µ
µ
µ
φ φ
µ
φ
− − − − − −
− −
+ +
 
= + +  ∆ ∆ ∆ 
 
= + +  ∆ ∆ ∆ 
 
= + +  ∆ ∆ 
 (7) 
where ,r tY  represents income and expenditure in region r in period t, , ,r t r ts Y Y≡  denotes 
region r’s share in expenditure in period t and r = 1, 2, 3.  
Short-run general equilibrium in region s requires that each firm meets the demand for its 
variety. For a variety produced in region s,  
 , ,s t s tx d=  (8) 
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where ,s tx  is the output of each firm located in region s. From equation (4), the short-run 
equilibrium operating profit per variety/entrepreneur in region s is  
 ,, , ,
s t
s t s t s t
px
px xπ β
σ
= − =  (9) 
Since profit equals the value of sales times 1 σ  and since total expenditure on manufacturers 
is Yµ , the total profit received by entrepreneurs is Yµ σ . Total income is ( )Y L Yµ σ= + , 
so that 
 LY σ
σ µ
=
−
 (10) 
Total profit is therefore ( )Lµ σ µ− . Equation (10) confirms that total income is invariant 
over time. From (10), (1 ) max , 1
2
Y L Lµ   − > −  
  


 
is equivalent to 
( )( )min (1 ) , 2 2 0µ σ µσ µ σ µσ+ − − − + − >    ; and ( )(1 ) max , 12Y L Lµ
 − > − 
 

  is 
equivalent to ( )( )min (2 ) 2 , 1 0µ σ µσ µ σ µσ+ − − − + − >    .The former is a (sufficient) 
non-full-specialization condition and the latter is a necessary one, where both are expressed in 
terms of the utility parameters. 
Using (4) to (10), the short-run equilibrium profit in region s is determined by the spatial 
distribution of entrepreneurs and the regional expenditure shares:  
 
13 3
1 1 1 1
, , , , ,
1 1
s t r t r t rs r t r t rs
r r
p YY P T s P p
σ
σ σ σ σ µπ µ φ
σ σ
−
− − − −
= =
   
= =   
   
∑ ∑  
Under our assumptions on trade costs across regions, we can write 
 ( )1 1 1 11, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3,t t t t t S t t L Ys P s P s P pσ σ σ σ µπ φ φ σ
− − − −= + +
 
 ( )1 1 1 12, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3,t t t S t t t t L Ys P s P s P pσ σ σ σ µπ φ φ σ
− − − −= + +
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or, alternatively: 
 1, 2, 3, 1, 2,1, 3,
1, 2, 3, (1 ) 1
t t t t t
t S L S t
t t t t S t S t t
s s s s sY Y s
N N
µ µπ φ φ φ
σ σ λ φ λ φ λ λ
   
= + + = + +    ∆ ∆ ∆ + − + −  
(11) 
 1, 2, 3, 1, 2,2, 3,
1, 2, 3, (1 ) 1
t t t t t
t S L S t
t t t t S t S t t
s s s s sY Y s
N N
µ µπ φ φ φ
σ σ λ φ λ φ λ λ
   
= + + = + +    ∆ ∆ ∆ + − + −  
(12) 
Regional incomes/expenditures are 
 1, 1,2t t t
Y L Nλ π= +  (13) 
 2, 2,(1 )2t t t
Y L Nλ π= + −  (14) 
 ( )3, 1tY L= −   (15) 
 1, 1,1 2
t t tY NLs
Y Y Y
λ π
= = +
  (16) 
 1, 1, 1, 2,1, 1, 3,
1, 2,2 2
t t t t t
t t S t
t t
Y N s sLs s
Y Y Y
λ π σ µ µλ φ
σ σ
 −
= = + = + + +  ∆ ∆ 
   (17) 
 
2, 2, 1, 2,
2, 3,
1, 2,
(1 )
(1 )
2 2
t t t t t
t t S t
t t
Y N s sLs s
Y Y Y
λ π σ µ µλ φ
σ σ
 − −
= = + = + − + +  ∆ ∆ 
   (18) 
 
3,
3,
(1 ) (1 )t t
Y Ls
Y Y
σ µ
σ
− −
= = = −

  (19) 
Using (17) to (19) and taking into account that 3, 1, 2,1t t ts s s= − − , the shares in 1, ts  and 2, ts , 
can be expressed in terms of tλ : 
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2, 2,
1,
1, 2,
(1 ) 2 1
2 2
1
S t S
t
t t
t
S
t
t t
s
µφ λ φσ µ σ µ σ µλ
σ
φσ µλ
  − − + − − − −     ∆ ∆     =
 
− −  ∆ ∆ 

 (20) 
 
( ) ( )
( )
1, 1,
2,
2, 1,
1
(1 ) 2 1 1
2 2
11
S t S
t
t t
t
S
t
t t
s
µφ λ φσ µ σ µ σ µ λ
σ
φσ µ λ
  −− − + − − − − −     ∆ ∆     =
 
− − −  ∆ ∆ 

 (21) 
Given that the agricultural price is 1, the real income of an entrepreneur in region s is: 
 , , ,s t s t s tP
µω π −=  (22) 
Given that the three regions shares in total expenditure do not depend on Lφ , from (11) and 
(12) – taking into account (19), (20) and (21) –, we can derive the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. Profit differentials are not affected by the distance of region 1 and region 2 
from region 3. 
Therefore, a change of the distance of region 1 and/or region 2 from region 3 has no impact 
on operating profits. This is because the demand for the manufactured goods is unitary elastic: 
the change in trade costs, via Lφ , determines a proportional change in the price index in region 
3 and a similar but inversely proportional change in the quantity demanded, so the overall 
change of expenditures on manufacturing in this region is zero. This is also because, since 
region 3 does not produce manufactured varieties a change in Lφ  does not impact on price 
indices in region 1 and 2. This is a result that follows from our simple set-up, the assumptions 
of a CES subutility function for manufactured goods and no manufacturing production in 
region 3: a change in transport costs towards the outside region has no effect. 
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4. The entrepreneurial migration hypothesis and the complete dynamical model 
The central dynamic equation is based on the replicator dynamics, widely used in 
evolutionary game theory:  
 ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1, 1, 2,
1, 2,
1
1 1 1
1 1
t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t
T
M
T
ω λω λ ω λ
λ λ γ λ γ λ
λ ω λ ω λ λ
  − + −    = + = + − 
+ − +    
 (23) 
where γ represents the migration speed and where ( ) 1,
2,
1tt
t
T
ω
λ
ω
= −  . According to  (23), the 
share of entrepreneurs in region 1, ( )tM λ , depends on a comparison between the real income 
gained in that region and the weighted average of the incomes in region 1 and 2. Taking into 
account the constraint, 0 1tλ≤ ≤ , the complete dynamical model is represented by the 
following piecewise smooth one-dimensional map: 
 1
0 ( ) 0
( ) ( ) 0 ( ) 1
1 ( ) 1
t
t t t t
t
if M
M if M
if M
λ
λ λ λ λ
λ
+
<
= Λ = ≤ ≤
 >
 (24) 
A long-run stationary equilibrium involves * *( )λ λΛ = , where *λ  represents a so-called fixed 
point of the map (25). There are three types of fixed points:  
i) the Core-Periphery equilibria are characterized by full agglomeration of manufacturing in 
one region. These are: 
(0) 0CPλ = , corresponding to complete agglomeration in region 2, 
which gives (0) 0M = ; and (1) 1CPλ = , corresponding to full agglomeration in region 1, which 
gives (1) 1M = .  
ii) the symmetric equilibrium is characterized by an equal split of the manufacturing sector 
between regions 1 and 2: * 1
2
λ = , that gives 1 1
2 2
M   = 
 
 and 1 0
2
T   = 
 
; 
iii) the asymmetric equilibria are characterized by incomplete agglomeration in one of the two 
regions of the customs union, with some industry still present in the other region. The 
following cases are possible:  
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Case 1: no asymmetric fixed point exists. 
Case 2: two asymmetric fixed points exist which are symmetric around 1/2: aλ , 1 aλ− ; 
Case 3: four asymmetric fixed points exist that are symmetric two by two around 1/2: aλ , 
1 aλ−  and bλ , 1 bλ− .  
These equilibria are obtained by solving ( )i iM λ λ=  and (1 ) 1i iM λ λ− = − ,  corresponding to 
( ) 0iT λ =  and (1 ) 0iT λ− = , where i = a, b. 
 
5. Existence and local stability of stationary equilibria 
In this section, we explore the local stability analysis of the fixed points listed above. Due to 
the symmetry of the map ( )tλΛ , a general property is that each equilibrium (stationary, 
periodic or aperiodic) is symmetric to itself or another equilibrium exists that is symmetric to 
such equilibrium around to 1
2
; similarly, the basins of attraction of each equilibrium, as well 
as any other invariant set, also enjoy this symmetric property. In what follows, this symmetric 
rule is applied to the fixed points (stationary equilibria) of the map ( )tλΛ .  
We find the local stability properties of the CP equilibria (1) 1CPλ =  and (0) 0CPλ = , by 
evaluating the one-side eigenvalues of the map ( )tM λ in correspondence of these equilibria: 
 ( ) ( )( )
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
T
M
T
γ′− < = − <
+
, ( ) ( )0 0 1 0 0M Tγ′< = + <  
From which 
 20 (1)
2
T
γ
< <
−
,  2 (0) 0T
γ
− < < , 
 
We explore the stability properties of the CP equilibrium (1) 1CPλ = . The same results apply to 
the other CP equilibrium by symmetry.  
14 
 
We have that ( )1 1 1M ′− < <  for  
 
1
12 ( ) ( )
µ σ
σγ κ φ φ κ φ
γ
− +
−− < <  (26) 
where, for convenience, we set: 
Sφ φ≡  and 2
2( )
( )[ 2 (1 )] [ (2 ) ]
σκ φ
σ µ φ µ σ φ
=
− + − + − +   
; and where ( ) 1κ φ >  for 
0 1φ≤ < .  
for 1 1 2σ µ< < + <  and 0 1φ≤ < , the right hand side inequality in (26) is always satisfied;  
for1 1 µ σ< + <  it can be shown that the right hand side inequality in (26) is satisfied for 
sufficiently high values of φ  and violated for low values (hint: we are dealing with two 
monotonically decreasing functions of φ , the first tends to infinity for 0φ → and it is equal to 
1 at 1φ = , the second is positive (and larger than 1) but finite at 0φ =  and it is equal to 1 at 
1φ = , since at 1φ =  the first derivative of the first function is smaller in absolute value than 
the derivative of the second function, the two functions necessarily cross at some Tφ φ= , 
where 0 1Tφ< < ).It is not possible to specify the corresponding bifurcation value for the trade 
freeness parameter Tφ φ=  explicitly. 
Note that for 1σ µ> + , as φ  crosses Tφ  from left to right, the map undergoes a so-called 
border collision bifurcation: the CP equilibrium (1) 1CPλ =  meets the upper branch of the 
asymmetric equilibrium gaining stability. Symmetrically, (0) 0CPλ =  meets the lower branch 
of the asymmetric equilibrium gaining stability. From this, we infer that the asymmetric 
equilibrium must have always the same local stability properties in the neighborhood of the 
CP equilibria (see Figures 2 and 4).  
Finally, the left hand side inequality in (26) is satisfied for a sufficiently small value of γ:  
 1
11
2
1 ( )
µ σ
σ
γ
φ κ φ
− +
−−
<
−
 (27) 
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When this latter condition does not hold, (1) 1CPλ =  is stable for 1 20 1φ φ φ< < < <  , where 1φ  
and 2φ  can only be obtained numerically by solving (27) with an equality sign. [ 1φ  and 2φ  
correspond to two flip bifurcation points, which are not visible due to the constraints of the 
map ( )tλΛ ].  
Moving on to the symmetric equilibrium, its local stability requires that the eigenvalue of the 
map ( )tM λ  (which coincides to that of the map ( )tλΛ ) evaluated at this equilibrium should 
lie within the interval ( 1,1)− :  
 
1 11 1 1
2 4 2
M Tγ   ′ ′− < = + <   
   
, 
which implies  
 8 1 0
2
T
γ
 ′− < < 
 
 (28) 
Concerning the inequality on the right hand side of (28), it is satisfied for  
 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
1
1
1 3 2
Pσ µ σ µφ φ
σ σ µ µ µ σ
− − −  < ≡ <
− − + + −


 
for 1 1 µσ< < +

, it follows that 0Pφ < . Therefore, this inequality can never be satisfied; 
for 1 µσ > +

 , as φ  crosses Pφ  from left to right, the map ( )tλΛ undergoes a so-called pitch-
fork bifurcation.  
A first interesting result we may highlight is that Pφ  depends positively on  : 
 ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) 2
2 2 1 1
0
1 3 2
P µ σ µ σ σφ
σ σ µ µ µ σ
− − −∂
= >
∂ − − + + −   
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which implies that the local stability of the symmetric equilibrium depends upon the dimen-
sion of the outside region as follows: increasing the size of the third region (reducing  ) has a 
destabilizing effect on this equilibrium and tends to favor agglomeration. 
In order to study in detail the properties of the pitchfork bifurcation, we first redefine our cen-
tral map to highlight the control parameter we interested in, trade freenessφ , and we verify 
how these may change when another crucial parameter, the size of the third region  , 
changes. We could replicate the same analysis for any other parameter. The redefined map is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 1 ,t t t tM Zφ λ λ γ λ φ λ= + −   , 
where ( ) ( )( )
,
,
1 ,
t
t
t t
T
Z
T
φ λ
φ λ
λ φ λ
=
+
. 
From the theory of dynamical systems (see Wiggins, 1990), in correspondence of a pitchfor-
fork bifurcation, that is, when Pφ φ=  and * 1 2λ = , the following conditions must hold: 
(i) 1, 0
2
PM φ
φ
∂   = ∂  
; 
(ii) 
2
2
1, 0
2
P
t
M φ
λ
∂   = ∂  
; 
(iii) 
2 1, 0
2
P
t
M φ
λ φ
∂   ≠ ∂ ∂  
 
(iv) 
3
3
1, 0
2
P
t
M φ
λ
∂   ≠ ∂  
. 
Moreover, the sign of the following expression can be used to determine on which side of 
Pφ the two branches of asymmetric equilibria, at least initially, lie:  
(v) 
3
3
2
1,
2 0
1,
2
P
t
P
t
M
or
M
φ
λ
φ
λ φ
∂  
 ∂  − > <
∂  
 ∂ ∂  
 
We have a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation when this expression is larger than zero and a 
subcritical pitchfork bifurcation when it is less than zero. 
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We have that: 
condition (i), which corresponds to 1, 0
2
PZ φ
φ
∂   = ∂  
, is verified due to the fact that at the sym-
metric equilibrium 1, 2,t tω ω=  and 
1, 2,1 1, ,
2 2
t tω ωφ φ
φ φ
∂ ∂   =   ∂ ∂   
 for anyφ ; 
condition (ii) corresponds to 
22
2 2
1 1, , 0
2 2
P P
t t
T Tφ φ
λ λ
∂ ∂   − =   ∂ ∂   
. It can be checked (via calcula-
tion) that this equality holds for any φ ; 
condition (iii) corresponds to
2 1, 0
2
P
t
T φ
λ φ
∂   ≠ ∂ ∂  
. After calculation we obtain the following re-
sult: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
2
2 2 1 1 3 2
0
1 1 1
µ σ σ σ µ µ µ σ
σ µ σ µ σ σ σ µ µ µ σ
− − − + + −   >
− − + − − + + −  

 
 
which is always satisfied; 
condition (iv) corresponds to 
3
3
1, 0
2
P
t
T φ
λ
∂   ≠ ∂  
. After calculation we obtain the following re-
sult: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
3 2 24 2 2
33
32 2 1 3 1 3 2 2 1 3 1 2 1
1 1 1
µ σ σ µ σ σ µ σ σ µ µ µ σ µ σ
σ µ σ σ σ µ µ µ σ
 − − − + − + − − + + − + −   −
− + − − + + −  
 
 
 
This expression could be negative, positive or zero depending on parameter values. If it is dif-
ferent from zero, given that 0 1µ σ< < < , the sign of (v) corresponds to that of the following 
expression: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 22 23 1 3 2 2 1 3 1 2 1σ µ σ σ µ σ σ µ µ µ σ µ σ − − + − + − − + + − + −      (29) 
This allows us to state the following proposition 2: 
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Proposition 2: It is possible to show that it exists a =   such that (29) is positive for <   
and it is negative for >  , with 0 1< <  for 1σ µ> + . 
Proof.  
First we rewrite (29) as 
2A B C+ +   
where: 
( ) ( )23 1 0A σ µ σ≡ − − < , 
( ) ( ) ( )223 2 2 1 3 ( )0B σ µ σ σ µ≡ − + − − ≥ <  
( ) ( )1 2 1 0C µ µ σ µ σ≡ + − + − >   . 
Therefore (29) admits one positive and one negative solution. In order to have real roots, it 
must be: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )2 42 2 4 2 2 24 12 8 3 4 10 12 3 1 4 1 0B AC σ σ µ σ σ σ µ σ σ∆ ≡ − = − − + − + − + − >  
0∆ = is a quartic equation that admits 4 solutions of which only two at most are real (or 
none).  
Define 2x µ≡ . We have that: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )2 42 2 2 212 8 3 4 10 12 3 1 4 1 0x xσ σ σ σ σ σ σ∆ = − − + − + − + − =  
This is now a second degree equation whose solutions, a bx and x , are real since 
( )( ) ( )2 5144 3 1 2 1 1 0σ σ σ∆ = − − − >  
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Moreover, these solutions are both negative for 3 31 1.183
4
σ +< < ≅  and they are one posi-
tive xa and one negative xb (with the positive larger than the negative) for
3 3 1.183
4
σ +> ≅ . 
Therefore: 
for 3 31 1.183
4
σ +< < ≅ 0∆ >  always. 
For 3 3 1.183
4
σ +> ≅ 0∆ >  for 0 1ax x< < > . Therefore also in this case 0∆ >  for all rele-
vant values of µ . 
Therefore 2 0A B C+ + =  admits two real solutions one positive and one negative. Let’s call 
the positive solution   , where
2
B
A
+ ∆
≡ − .  Given that A < 0, the expression (29) is posi-
tive for 0 ≤ <  and it is negative for >  .  
Finally, notice that the condition 1<  corresponds to 
 ( ) ( )( )( )212 1 1 0σ σ µ µ σ σ µ− + − + − <  
That can be further reduced to 1σ µ> + . 
Q.E.D.  
At this stage it could be interesting two consider two simpler cases:  
First case: 1= . By setting 1= , we are back to the standard FC model. Expression (29) be-
comes: 
 ( )( )1 1 ( )µ σ µ σ σ µ+ − − + +  
which is negative for 1σ µ> + . That is, for this case, only a subcritical pitchfork bifurcation 
can occur. As shown in Fig. 2(a), the curve of asymmetric equilibria lies on the left of Pφ .  
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(a) 
 
       0.1                      φ                      0.25 
2σ =  
0.45µ =  
1=  
Size of third region:  
1 0− =  
 
(b) 
 
0.32                      φ                      0.34 
3σ =  
0.45µ =  
2
3
=
 
Size of third region: 
11
3
− =
 
 
(c) 
 
0.1                      φ                      0.15 
2σ =  
0.45µ =  
2
3
=
 
Size of third region: 
11
3
− =
 
 
  
 
Figure 2 
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The two existing asymmetric equilibria aλ and 1 aλ− are unstable. That is, for any such equi-
librium (1 ) 1aM λ′ − > and ( ) 1aM λ′ > that correspond to ( ) 0aT λ′ >  and (1 ) 0aT λ′ − > . This 
can be verified only numerically as the Figure 3 (so-called “wiggle” diagram) below shows: 
 
Fig. 3: Wiggle diagram, showing the stability of equilibria for 1= , 0.45µ = 0.22φ =  and 
2σ =  
As shown in Fig. 3, plotting ( )T λ  with respect to λ , for the given parameter configuration, 
the symmetric equilibrium is locally stable stable since 1 0
2
T  ′ < 
 
. At the same time, also the 
CP equilibria are attracting given the boundary conditions in (24), which give 
(0) (1) 0′ ′Λ = Λ =  (that is, due to the presence of borders the CP equilibria are ‘superstable’, 
i.e. the first derivative of the map evaluated at those equilibria is equal to zero). Instead, the 
two asymmetric equilibria are unstable, given that the slope of ( )T λ in correspondence of 
these equilibria is positive. aλ  and 1 aλ−  separate symmetrically within the unitary interval 
(0, 1), the basins of attraction of the symmetric equilibrium, ( ),1a aλ λ− , of the CP equilib-
rium (0) 0CPλ = , )0, aλ , and of the CP equilibrium (1) 1CPλ = , (1 ,1aλ −  .  
Second case: 2 3= . This case corresponds to an equal distribution of the agricultural sector 
among the three regions. If 2 3= , expression (29) can be rewritten as  
 ( ) ( )22 4 5 2 3 1
3
µ σ µ σ µ µ − − + + − −   (30) 
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Solving for σ, we obtain:  
 5 (49 16)1 1,2
4i
i
µ µ µ
σ
± +
= + =  
with 2 10 1σ σ< < < . We can disregard 2σ  and conclude that (30) is larger than zero for 
11 σ σ< <  and it is less than zero for 1 1σ σ> > . In Figure 2(b), we set 1 1σ σ> > , therefore 
(30) is negative. As φ  crosses Pφ  a subcritical bifurcation emerges. The curve of asymmetric 
equilibria lies entirely on the left of Pφ . The two existing asymmetric equilibria are unstable. 
See Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4: Wiggle diagram showing the stability of equilibria for 2 / 3= , 0.45µ = 0.333φ =  and 
3σ =  
In Figure 2(c), we set 11 σ σ< < , therefore (30) is positive. As φ  crosses 
Pφ  from left to right, 
a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation emerges. The curve of asymmetric equilibria lies, at least 
initially, on the right  of Pφ . Four asymmetric equilibria may exist. The two external 
equilibria, bλ  and 1 bλ− , are unstable. This is due to the fact that due to the border collision 
bifurthe CP equilibria gain stability (see above). Instead, the two interior asymmetric 
equilibria, aλ  and 1 aλ− , are stable. This is due to the fact that in the neighborhood of the 
symmetric equilibrium the pitchfork bifurcation must be supercritical. The disappearance of 
the four asymmetri equilibria occurs via a so-called fold bifurcation. Typically according to 
such type of bifurcation by varying a parameter (in our case by reducing φ ) two equilibria 
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emerge (one stable and one unstable). In our case, due to symmetry, this occurs both below 
and above * 1
2
λ = .  
To check further on the stability properties of the asymmetric equilibria see Figure 5, where, 
for 11 σ σ< < , we have plotted ( )T λ  for different values of the trade freeness parameter. For 
0.109φ =  and 0.11φ = , only the external asymmetric equilibria coexist with the symmetric 
and the CP equilibrium; the external asymmetric equilibria delimit the basins of attraction of 
the stable equilibria: a situation analogous to Fig. 4. By increasing slightly φ , in the example 
up to 0.112φ = , the two stable interior asymmetric equilibria emerge, for which ( ) 1aM λ′ <  
and (1 ) 1aM λ′ − < , that correspond to ( ) 0aT λ′ <  and (1 ) 0aT λ′ − < . 
The basins of attraction are now given by )0, bλ  for the CP equilibrium (0) 0CPλ = , ( ),0.5bλ  
for the interior asymmetric equilibrium aλ , ( )0.5,1 bλ−  for other stable asymmetric equilib-
rium aλ  and finally, (1 ,1bλ −   for the CP equilibrium (1) 1CPλ = . Notice that the symmetric 
equilibrium, which is unstable after crossing the bifurcation value Pφ , separates the basins of 
attraction of the two interior asymmetric equilibria.  
 
Fig. 5: Wiggle diagram showing the stability of equilibria for 2 / 3= , 0.45µ =  and 3σ =  and 
for different values of the trade freeness parameter: 0.109φ = 0.11φ = 0.112φ =  and 0.113φ =  
24 
 
Finally, in Fig. 6 we present the general case 0 1< < . These simulations that the negative 
impact of the size of the third region on Pφ  is significant.  
Finally, concerning the inequality on the left hand side of (28), it holds for a sufficiently small 
value of γ  or for a sufficiently high value of   (see also below). 
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2σ =  
0.45µ =  
2
3
=  
Size of third region:  
1 1/ 3− =  
 
 
2σ =  
0.45µ =  
2 1.09
3
= ⋅  
Size of third region:  
1 0.273− =  
 
 
2σ =  
0.45µ =  
2 1.1
3
= ⋅  
Size of third region:  
1 0.267− =  
  
 
Figure 6 
 
6. Preliminary results on global dynamics  
As it is stated in the previous sections, the map Λ has two CP-fixed points λ=0 and λ =1, the 
symmetric fixed point λ *=1/2, and it can also have four more, asymmetric, fixed points, λa, 1- 
λa and λb, 1- λb (which are symmetric with respect to λ* by pairs). 
Let us write down the expressions of the bifurcation curves of the fixed point λ*=1/2, related 
to its eigenvalue ± 1. The eigenvalue the map Λ evaluated at λ* can be written as   
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 (1 ) 2 ( )(1 )'( *) 1 .
(1 ) ( 1) (1 ) (1 )
M γ φ µ µφ σ µ φλ η
φ σ σ φ µ φ
 − − − −
= ≡ + + + − + − − 
  
 
The value η = 1 corresponds to the pitchfork bifurcation. This bifurcation holds if  
 (1 ) (1 ) 2 .
( )(1 ) ( 1)pf
µ σ φ µ φ φ
σ µ φ σ
 + − −
= ≡ − − − − 
   
  
The value η = -1 is related to the flip bifurcation. The flip bifurcation occurs if  
 ( (1 ) (1 ) 2(1 ) 2 .
( )(1 ) ( 1) (1 ) ( )(1 )fl
σ φ µ φ µ φ µφ
σ µ φ σ γ φ σ µ φ
 + − − +
= ≡ + + − − − − − − 
   
To get an idea about the global dynamics of the map Λ let us fix μ=0.45, γ=20 and consider 
the (f,  )-parameter plane for different values of σ.  
First, let σ=2. In Fig.7 we present the 2Dim bifurcation diagram in the (f,  )-parameter plane 
where different colours correspond to attracting cycles of different periods (up to the period 
equals 33). The two curves pf=   and fl=   related to the pitchfork and, respectively, the 
flip bifurcation of the fixed point λ* are plotted using the related equations. To get this 2Dim 
diagram only one initial condition was used, so, multistability cannot be observed in such a 
case. In order to clarify the dynamics let us consider 1Dim bifurcation diagrams.  
 
Figure 7 2Dim bifurcation diagram in the (f,  )-parameter plane at σ=2, μ=0.45, γ=20.  
27 
 
The 1Dim diagrams related to the straight lines with arrows are shown in Fig. 8 (horizontal 
line) and Fig. 9 (vertical line). 
First, let us fix the value 2 / 3=  and vary the parameter f in the range (0, 0.15) (the related 
parameter pass is shown in Fig.7 by a horizontal line with an arrow). The corresponding 1Dim 
bifurcation diagram is shown in Fig.8 (a) together with its two enlargements, in (b) and (c). 
Let us comment on the bifurcation sequence starting from the attracting fixed point λ* (e.g., at 
f = 0.055) and will decrease the value of f (see Fig.8 (b)). At 3φ φ=  a supercritical period-
doubling bifurcation occurs leading to the attracting 2-cycle denoted g₂; then at 2φ φ=  this 
cycle undergoes a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation resulting in two more (coexisting) at-
tracting 2-cycles. Each of these cycles undergoes a cascade of period-doubling bifurcations 
following the 'logistic' scenario up to the pairwise merging of two coexisting 2-cyclic attrac-
tors in one 2-cyclic attractor due to the homoclinic bifurcation of the 2-cycle g₂. At f=f₁ the 
chaotic interval has a contact with its basin of attraction, bounded by the two repelling CP 
fixed points, after which these two fixed points become stable. 
Now consider the enlargement of Fig.8 (a) shown in (c). At f=f₄ a border collision bifurca-
tion leads to the stabilisation of the CP fixed points and to the appearance of two more repel-
ling fixed points λa, 1- λa. At f=f₅ the fixed point λ* undergoes a supercritical pitchfork bi-
furcation leading to two more fixed points, λb and 1- λb. Then at f=f₆ we observe a reverse 
fold bifurcation due to which the four fixed points λa, 1- λa and λb, 1- λb  merge by pairs and 
disappear. 
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Figure 8 In (a): 1Dim bifurcation diagram at μ=0.45, σ=2, γ=20, 2 / 3= , f ∈ (0, 0.15);  In 
(b) and (c): enlargements of two windows indicated by rectangles marked I and II in (a). 
Let us come back to the 2Dim diagram in Fig. 7, fix f = 0.02 and will vary the value of the 
parameter  . The 1Dim bifurcation diagram for f= 0.02 and   ∈ (0.3, 0.65) is shown in Fig. 
9. We observe that at 1=   the fixed point λ
*=1/2 undergoes the supercritical pitchfork bifur-
cation (for decreasing  ) leading to two fixed points λ*₁=λa and λ*₂=1-λa. If we continue to 
decrease the value of   at 2=   each of these fixed points undergoes a supercritical period-
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doubling bifurcation and then it follows the 'logistic' bifurcation scenario. For the values of   
less than certain value this scenario is observed in the reverse order up to the period-doubling 
bifurcation at 3=   leading to the attracting fixed point. Thus, for example, at   = 0.3 we are 
back to the two attracting fixed points λ*₁ and λ*₂. 
 
Figure 9 1Dim bifurcation diagram at μ=0.45, σ=2, γ=20, f=0.02,   ∈ (0.3, 0.65). 
 
Figure 10 An enlargement of the window indicated in Fig. 9. 
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Starting again from the attracting fixed point λ*=1/2 (see Fig. 9) and increasing the value of   
one can see that at 5=   the fixed points λ
* undergoes a subcritical period-doubling bifurca-
tion that can be seen in Fig. 10 which shows an enlargement of the Fig. 9. Here the dashed 
colour lines are related to the points of a repelling cycle of period 2 denoted g₂′  born at 
4=   due to the fold bifurcation together with an attracting cycle g₂ of period 2. The parame-
ter range   ∈ 4 5( , )   corresponds to coexisting attracting fixed point λ* and 2-cycle g₂. Then, 
at the subcritical period-doubling bifurcation the points of g₂′ merge with the fixed point λ* 
and after this fixed point becomes repelling so that the only attractor is the 2-cycle g₂. If we 
continue to increase the value of  , at 6=   the 2-cycle g₂ undergoes a supercritical pitch-
fork bifurcation leading to two new 2-cycles ga₂ and gb₂. Each of these cycles undergoes a 
'logistic' sequence of bifurcations (for   ∈ 6 7( , )   we again have coexisting attractors) up to 
the moment of homoclinic bifurcation of the 2-cycle g₂ leading to merging of the attractors. 
After this bifurcation the attractor is unique. It exists up to the contact with its basin of attrac-
tion bounded by the repelling CP fixed points. As a result these fixed points are stabilised.  
Note that the period-doubling bifurcation of λ* observed in Fig. 8 (b) is supercritical and it is 
subcritical in Fig. 10, while the pitchfork bifurcation of λ*  in Fig. 8 (b) is subcritical and it is 
supercritical in Fig. 9. 
To compare the bifurcation structure shown in Fig. 7 with the one for a larger value of σ, we 
show in Fig.11 the 2Dim bifurcation diagram in the ( , )φ  -parameter plane at σ=8, μ=0.45, 
γ=20. The basic sequence of bifurcations is similar, but we leave its complete characteriza-
tion, as well as more detailed investigation of the dynamics of the map, for future work.  
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Figure 11 2Dim bifurcation diagram in the ( , )φ  -parameter plane at σ=8, μ=0.45, γ=20.  
 
7. Final remarks 
The (scant) NEG literature on three-region models has dealt so far with the impact of trade 
policy with a third region on industrial agglomeration in a two-region home country. In con-
trast, the FE-NEG model presented in this paper has delivered results on how economic inte-
gration between two regions (1 and 2) participating in a customs union impacts on the distri-
bution of industrial firms within the union, holding constant the distance between the union 
itself and the rest of the world (region 3). We have shown that:  
1) because our simple set up, a change in trade policy with the rest of the world does not 
impact on profit differentials between regions 1 and 2, thus leaving unaffected the dis-
tribution of industrial firms within the union; 
2) it is the size (of the market) of the third region that matters for the balance between 
centripetal and centrifugal forces between the two countries/regions inside the integra-
tion area. This leads to the general conclusion that the effects of a trade liberalisation 
between the two countries inside the integration area strictly depends upon the size of 
the market external to the union. Such a result holds looking at both stable and unsta-
ble symmetric equilibria as summarized in the following two points; 
3) an increase of the external demand coming from the third region, leads the symmetric 
equilibrium between region 1 and 2 to lose stability at a lower value of the trade free-
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ness inside the integration area. That is, as shown in Brülhart et al. (2004), stronger 
outside links favour agglomeration within the integration area; 
4) in addition, and this is our main result, the size of the third region also influences what 
happens, if the symmetric equilibrium is unstable. For a smaller third region the ag-
glomerative forces outweigh the deglomerative forces leading to full agglomeration in 
one of the regions inside the integration area. Instead, for a bigger third region, asym-
metries weaken the agglomerative processes and strengthen the deglomerative forces – 
and interior asymmetric equilibra can be established. 
This latter results is important for two reasons: a) because it shows that even if with a reduc-
tion of trade costs with the integration area the symmetric equilibrium loses stability (as found 
also in the papers reviewed above), the long-run outcome need not be full agglomeration, but 
may also be partial agglomeration (thus a reduction of trade costs does not lead to extreme re-
gional dispersion); b) because it is one of the rare examples in the NEG literature that pro-
duces partial agglomeration as the outcome of an endogenous process. 
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